When the African Union-brokered talks between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan over a dam on the Nile again failed last month, it did not mark a new disagreement over sharing vital water resources.
Rather, it was a case of regional rivalry that trumps the science and collaboration insights laid out by African and Western mediators in multiple draft agreements.
Since then, the Egyptian media has sounded like war drums and a border dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia has broken into violence.
At the center of the dispute is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), built by successive governments in Addis Ababa with the aim of lifting millions out of poverty.
The dam’s turbines, located near the source of the Blue Nile in northwestern Ethiopia, should generate 6,000 megawatts of hydropower – crucial in a country where more than half of the population, some 50 million people, has no access to electricity, and the demand for electricity is increasing by 30% annually.
The solution to the water safety problems in Egypt and Sudan, according to observers, is simple: coordination and data exchange.
But even amid indications that the resurgence of traditional American diplomacy could help resolve the dam dispute, observers say mediators must also face currents stronger than the Nile itself: nationalism, territorial disputes, and a struggle for supremacy in the Horn of Africa.
Regional supremacy
For Ethiopia, the dam project promises to stimulate the country’s emergence as a geopolitical player. Even amid the battle for the country’s future that erupted into war in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region last November, the dam remains a cause that unites the diverse nation.
“There has been a sense of dishonesty among the government and the Ethiopian people in general that we as a poor country have not been able to use a natural resource that comes from Ethiopia,” said Awol Allo, an Ethiopian analyst. and lecturer at Keele University, UK.
“This dam project signals the resurgence of the Ethiopian state after the decades of shame, poverty and famine with which it has been identified.”
A sense of personal investment and national unity around the dam solidified after the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other lenders refused to fund the GERD. Ethiopia decided in 2010 to go it alone and pay for it with government money and bonds bought by private individuals, and broke ground on the project in 2011.
“Every Ethiopian sees themselves as a stakeholder in a project that is not just about energy needs, but also a statement that Ethiopia is an important, powerful country that can do it alone and assert itself on the regional stage,” said Allo.
Downstream drama
Despite the draft agreements, the water-sharing disputes between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia have only grown since the completion of construction of the GERD in 2020 and Addis Ababa began filling the reservoirs in July.
Downstream countries that have long been accustomed to the unrestricted flow of the Nile for their agriculture and fresh water have been alarmed by the dam’s potential impact on their water and food security.
Egypt, 1,000 miles downstream from the dam, has made a historic claim to a lion’s share of the water from the Nile and sees GERD as a threat to national security. Egypt currently relies on the Nile for crops for 90% of its fresh water and most of its irrigation water to feed its 105 million inhabitants. It is also concerned about possible flooding and drought.
Egypt and Sudan disapprove of the lack of engineering studies and assessments of the dam’s environmental and social impact downstream.
Tensions are now high as Addis Ababa will fill the dam’s reservoir by 11 billion cubic meters this year after the first 4.9 BCM it filled in July 2020. The dam has a total capacity of 74 BCM. “The biggest problem is not knowing how Ethiopia plans to use and operate the dam, at what times of the year, what quantities and what the impact will be,” said Amal Kandeel, an environmental and policy adviser and former director of Climate Change, Environment. and safety program at the Middle East Institute. “Downstream countries cannot plan without knowing it; they need clarity.
“Egypt will not benefit from the dam,” she says. “But if there is coordination, facts, evidence and data shared with minimal transparency, any damage will be reduced.”
For Egypt, a “humiliation”
Egypt’s inability to halt or influence the project has become a symbol of the government’s inward focus over the past decade and its withdrawal from the Arab and African scene, which domestic critics say is the geopolitical significance of Egypt has drastically reduced.
Egyptian insiders are secretly saying that the prospect of Ethiopian control over the water and food security of the most populous Arab country is seen as “a humiliation” driving Cairo’s hardline.
“Egypt was the largest geopolitical player for 50 or 60 years, not only in the Middle East, but also in the northeastern Horn of Africa,” said Rashid Abdi, Horn of Africa analyst.
“Times have changed, you have new governments that are becoming more assertive on the regional and world stage and acting independently,” he says. “It’s a natural progression that Egypt finds uncomfortable.”
Egypt has pushed for intervention from the United States, its Arab allies and the UN Security Council. In June, Secretary of State Sameh Shoukry warned of a conflict if the United Nations did not intervene.
Following the breakup of talks last month, Egyptian state-influenced media called for the use of “violence” against Ethiopia, calling for surgical attacks on the GERD’s electricity infrastructure.
It’s good for Sudan, but …
Meanwhile, regional alliances and an age-old border dispute have turned Ethiopia’s northwestern neighbor from a silent supporter of the dam to a spoiler.
Observers and experts agree: The benefits of the GERD for Sudan are many.
The dam, 20 miles from the Sudan-Ethiopian border, will reduce the flooding that devastated Sudan in the past. Floods from the Blue Nile destroyed a third of the country’s cultivated farmland last year, destroying 100,000 homes and killing 100 people, exacerbating Sudan’s economic crisis.
The reduction of floods and the sharing of irrigation water would help Sudan cultivate more than 50 million hectares of arable land that has been abandoned due to flooding and mismanagement, a crucial boost to an agricultural sector that is Sudan’s largest employer and accounts for 30% of the gross domestic product of the country. Product.
Ethiopia has also vowed to export cheap electricity to Sudan.
Honest people in Khartoum will tell you that the dam is a net positive from all logical, logistical and economic perspectives. Objectively, Sudan would benefit from the dam, ”said Jonas Horner, Sudan analyst and deputy director for the Horn of Africa at the International Crisis Group.
“But it’s not that simple,” he said, pointing out Sudan’s need to balance regional alliances.
Khartoum – militarily close to Egypt, diplomatically guilty of Ethiopia, and financially and politically dependent on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are allied to Egypt – is reluctant to support the dam on the one hand or come down hard for Addis Ababa, on the other hand.
This complicated balancing act was disrupted in December by the violent resurgence of an age-old Sudan-Ethiopia border dispute.
Sudanese patrols have reportedly been fired on by Ethiopian militias, and the Sudanese army and Ethiopian federal forces clashed several times this month.
Ethiopian officials blame Cairo for stirring tensions, arguing an Egyptian plot to prolong the conflict and derail the completion of the GERD.
Traditional American Diplomacy
Observers agree that the dispute provides the Biden administration with an opportunity to demonstrate its sworn return to traditional American diplomacy.
The Trump administration’s few forays into the GERD dispute were in favor of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, an ally of Trump. Last July, the Trump administration partially suspended US aid to Ethiopia after Addis Ababa rejected a draft agreement drawn up by Washington that it said favored Cairo. President Donald Trump publicly warned that Cairo would “blow that dam” if the talks fail.
In contrast, President Joe Biden’s Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, vowed in his confirmation hearing last month to keep “active engagement” to address a rise in tensions that “have the potential to spread throughout the Horn of America. Destabilize Africa “, indicating that he is considering appointing a US Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa.
But observers warn that the Biden government must untangle the web of regional politics, nationalist zeal and power games to return the three states to basics: water.
“The war in Tigray has caused instability in the Ethiopian state, and now you have the border issue with Sudan that is clearly linked to the GERD issue. You have domestic actors in each of these countries lobbying external actors to promote their interests, ”said Mr Allo.
“It will be difficult for any US government with all the goodwill in the world to fix things.”
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Originally published